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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The decided weight of authority supports the Schmidt case. Prior
to the instant case, those cases denying removal, on grounds of public
policy, seem to have been restricted to Illinois. 19
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-"RELEASED TIME"
PROGRAM HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Petitioner seeks to test the constitutionality of the action of the Board
of Education of the City of New York, whereby defendants established
a "released time" program to enable public school children to obtain reli-
gious instruction during hours otherwise demanded for secular studies by
the New York Compulsory Education Law.' The United States Supreme
Court, in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, 2
held that the statute, providing for the release of public school children
from classes, was constitutional. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Prior to the Clauson case, the Supreme Court had reviewed only one
"released time" program, that of the City of Champaign, Illinois,8 in the
case of McCollum v. Board of Education.4 The Champaign program was
held unconstitutional. Now, after "released time" systems of one form or
another have existed in this country for nearly thirty years5 without the
benefit of a Supreme Court ruling on their constitutionality, one such
program has been struck down and another sustained on the basis of dif-
ferences which have been called "trivial" 6 and of "no significance."'7
The problem in the Clauson case is, of course, basically the same as that
presented in the McCollum case, i.e., "Whether this system has prohibited
the 'free exercise' of religion or is a law 'respecting an establishment of
religion' within the meaning of the First Amendment." The factual situa-
tions presented by the two cases, however, disclose several seemingly
fundamental differences.
The most apparent of these lies in the fact that in Champaign, the
classes in religious instruction were conducted in the public school build-
19 Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill. 43 (1849); Seaton v. Seaton, 337 Ill. App. 651, 86 N.E.
2d 435 (1949); Chase v. Chase, 70 111. App. 572 (1897).
1 16 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York (1940) Part 1, Art. 65, § 3202.
2 Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951).
SThere was no underlying state enabling act involved.
4333 U.S. 203 (1948).
5 An informative outline of the history and development of "released time" pro-
grams is given by Frankfurter, J., in his separate concurring opinion in McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 225 (1948).
6 Jackson, J., dissenting in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
7 Black, J., dissenting in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
8 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 310 (1952).
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ings and on school property. In New York, the religious classes can only
be held wholly "outside the [public] school grounds." 9
Secondly, the public school officials of Champaign had power and
authority to approve or reject any course of instruction offered by a
religious group desiring to participate in the program; they had also the
power to reject any individual instructor who was proposed to teach one
of the classes. This power is clearly a means by which any religious group
or groups could be effectively prevented from participating in the pro-
gram-a latent possibility which could develop into discrimination by gov-
ernment officials. Still another discriminatory possibility lies in the fact
that the only sects which were allowed to participate in the program were
the member groups of "The Champaign Council of Religious Education." 10
Under the New York system, however, the potentialities of such dis-
crimination are substantially reduced, if not eliminated, because the reli-
gious courses must be maintained and operated by or under the control of
the religious bodies.' Furthermore, a program for religious instruction
may be initiated by any religious organization, in co-operation with the
parents of pupils concerned.1
2
Also, as was pointed out in the McCollum case, school officials and
teachers actively participated in enrolling pupils for religious instruction.
This situation gives a very solid basis for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's con-
tention that there was an "obvious pressure [by the schools] upon children
to attend" the religious classes.
1 3
Under the New York program, on the other hand, there can be no
announcement of any kind in the public schools relative to the program;1
4
religious organizations, in co-operation with parents, will assume full
responsibility for attendance,' 5 and there shall be no comment by any
principal or teacher on the attendance or non-attendance of any pupil for
religious instruction.1
6
With regard to the use or non-use of public school buildings, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in upholding the Champaign plan,1 7 said it was
"apparent" that the plan was "to all intents and purposes exactly the same"
as the system in the case of Latimer v. Board of Education of the City of
9 1 N.Y. Official Code Comp. 683, Regulations of the Commissioner of Education
of the State of New York, Art. 17, S 154(1).
10 Brief for Appellant at 31, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
11 1 N.Y. Official Code Comp. 683, Regulations of the Commissioner of Education
of the State of New York, Art. 17, S 154(2).
12 Ibid.
13 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
14Regulations of Board of Education of the City of New York, Rule 1.
15 Ibid., Rule 3.
16 Ibid., Rule 6.
17 McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 111. 14, 71 N.E. 2d 161 (1947).
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Chicago,18 and the fact that in one the classes were held in the schoolrooms
while in the other at places outside the school property was of no signif-
icance. The New York Court of Appeals, in the Clauson case, however,
pointed.out that difference as being of no little importance. 19 Likewise,
the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in the McCollum case seemed to
be the "use of tax supported property for religious instruction. '20 In fact,
the sole relief sought in the McCollum case was to prohibit all instruction
in, and teaching of, religious education in the public schools.
Notwithstanding Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in that case, wherein he
concludes from the principal opinions that they ban "any use of a pupil's
school time whether that use is on or off the school grounds,"'21 what was
actually held in the case must be considered with reference to what was
petitioned. Recognizing this, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court
in the Clauson case, said, with reference to the McCollum case, "In that
case the classrooms were turned over to religious instructors. We accord-
ingly held that the programs violated the First Amendment."22
The hypothesis that released time programs per se constitute an uncon-
stitutional aid to religious groups has been vigorously propounded and
attacked in both the McCollum and the Clauson cases. The negative side of
the argument is well put by Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court
in Zorach v. Clauson:23
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as
wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem neces-
sary .... When the state encourages religious instruction or co-operates with
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.... The government must be neutral when it comes to competition be-
tween sects.24
The affirmative view is well summed up by Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the Court in the McCollum case. He there says, and repeats in his dis-
sent in the instant case, that "the state ... affords sectarian groups an in-
valuable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes
through use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. 25
18 394 II1. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305 (1946).
19 Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 168, 100 N.E. 2d 463, 470 (1951).
2 0 McColIum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 209 (1948).
21 Ibid., at 240.
22 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952).
23 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
24 Ibid., at 331.
25 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 316 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
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That the state did "help" sectarian groups under the Champaign pro-
gram cannot be seriously questioned; the threat of the truant officer if the
released pupil did not attend his religious instruction, and the solicitation
of pupils by secular teachers in the public schools are examples of that
"help."
But how does the state "help" religious groups in New York? The verb
signifies some type of affirmative action which, though admittedly present
under the Champaign system, does not evidence itself in the New York
case. There the regulations set out specifically that the classes may not be
held within the public schools,2-' .that the classes were never to be men-
tioned by teachers or principals, 27 and that the public school system de-
clined any responsibility for the released students' attendance in classes
of religious instruction.2s The only "help" which can be said to have been
rendered by the New York City Board of Education is a purely passive
and negative allowance of the program to operate if and how it can.
The Supreme Court expresses this same view of the "help" rendered in
the instant case, and goes on to conclude the opinion with:
We follow the McCollum case. But we cannot expand it to cover the present
released time program unless separation of Church and State means that public
institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules to accomodate the re-
ligious needs of the people. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a
philosophy of hostility to religion. 29
TORTS-RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED CHILD TO SUE
HIS PARENT FOR PERSONAL TORT
Plaintiff, a minor seven years of age, instituted an action by his next
friend against his father and another. Defendants were partners in a busi-
ness which required the maintenance of a gasoline pump on the premises
of the family home where plaintiff resided. Although the father knew that
plaintiff and other children often played near the pump, he was negligent
in its operation. As a result, a fire originated near the pump and severely
burned plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that an unemancipated
child has the right to sue his parent for negligence in the latter's business
or vocational capacity. Signs V. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743
(1952).
From the early common law, the law has recognized the right of an
unemancipated minor child to bring a tort action against the parent in
matters affecting property.' It has also been held that actions for per-
26 Note 9 supra. 27 Note 16 supra.
2SNote 15 supra.
2 9 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
1 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 V. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Preston v. Preston, 102
Conn. 96, 128 At. 292 (1925); Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895);
Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Prosser, Torts § 99 (1941).
